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Which of the three steps (identify, correct, prevent) do you believe is the most important and why?
Deviations from standard operating procedures cannot be corrected or prevented without proper familiarization of the procedures. I therefore believe that identification is the most important of the three steps. Plant personnel should be fully acquainted with standard operating procedures, prescribed operating conditions, operating limits, and potential consequences of deviations from normal operation, in order to begin to correct any deviations from normal and safe operating conditions and prevent incidents from occurring.
An experienced chemical engineer, you have been promoted to the management team of a newly constructed CPI facility. Suggest two measures you will take to ensure that all personnel at the facility complete the three steps for preventing normalization of deviation listed at the end of the article.
- Provide all personnel with relevant documentation of the process at the facility, specifying operating conditions and limits and the hazards associated with working outside of these limits.
- Ensure all personnel complete process safety management courses which provides information on the hazards and associated risks, and measures for preventing/mitigating incidents which may occur as a consequence of these risks.
- Ensure that operators and engineers have the technical background to understand the process, how it operates, and why hazardous conditions occur when operational limits are exceeded.
In 3-5 sentences, discuss the concept of normalization of deviation as a major contributing factor to the Challenger disaster
Operators and engineers working on the Challenger shuttle were aware that the O-rings used to seal the shuttle’s booster joints were unsafe for use at low temperatures (as specified by the manufacturer), and had been significantly eroded in previous missions. The atmospheric temperature on the day of the Challenger disaster was unusually low and highly conducive to the catastrophic failure of the O-ring seals. This was overlooked, since failures of the O-rings in previous missions occurred with minimal consequences.